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UNFAIR DISMISSALS IN AUSTRALIA: DOES ARBITRATION FAVOUR
THE EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYEE?
Abstract
The Workplace Relations Act 1996 provides statutory protection against unfair dismissal for
employees under federal jurisdiction. This research involves an empirical analysis of decisions
dealing with complaints of unfair dismissals under this legislation over a 4-year period to
determine the factors associated with arbitrators' (Commissioners employed by the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission) decisions to uphold or deny complaints and to award a
particular remedy.
Research findings conclude that that certain variables significantly influence the decisions of
arbitrators. It also confirms the fear of some legal experts that lack of procedural fairness will
not feature as significant variable in the unfair dismissal equation because of the lesser emphasis
placed on it by this legislation in contrast to itspredecessor (Industrial Relations Reform Act,
1993).
This research will prove useful to the main stakeholders (employers, HR/IR managers,
employees, government, employee advocates, unions, employer associations, arbitrators and
academics) of the employment relations scene.
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INTRODUCTION
In Australia, federal unfair dismissal provisions had been in operation from March 1994, when
Parliament under the Labor Government amended the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (lR Act) by
passing the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 with a new Part VIA relating to termination of
employment (Blackford, 1999:217). The amendments contained the most comprehensive
protections against unfair dismissal ever seen in Australia (Howell, 1998:63).
The significant number of arbitration cases surrounding employer-initiated termination of
employment reflects the pursuit of employees' individual rights and justice in the workplace. The
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WR Act) introduced major changes to the federal law relating to
the protection of employees against unfair dismissal from their employment including further
restricting the already limited relief available to employees who have been unfairly dismissed
(Lawrence, 1998:53). Many workers have been excluded altogether from the operation of the
WR Act. These factors are reflected in the very drastic reduction in the number of applications
for relief under federal legislation since the WR Act came into effect. In the period from 31
December 1996 to 3 October 1997, 5222 federal unfair dismissal applications were made,
compared with 11,196 applications during the same period in 1996 (Howell, 1998:66). This
represents a 51% decline. It may be argued that this was the primary objective of this legislation.
It is worth noting that not all applications proceed to arbitration. A good number are
discontinued, others are turned down by the AIRC due to lack of merit (for example outside the
prescribed time limits for application), while others are settled during mediation provided by the
AIRC. Only a fraction of the applications proceed all the way to arbitration.
The study aimed at gaining an insight into how the Commissioners of the Australian Industrial
Relations Commission (AIRC) in their capacity as arbitrators exercised arbitral jurisprudence in
the course of interpreting the unfair termination provisions of the WR and its effects on
outcomes.
UNFAIR DISMISSALS AND CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH
It comes as no surprise that employers' decisions to terminate the services of employees for
misconduct, incompetence or redundancy are challenged in significant numbers through
arbitration or via the courts. While the employer's right of termination is an acknowledged
prerogative of management, no such exercise of management authority impacts adversely on an
employee as does the termination of employment. In reality people build much of their lives
around their jobs. Their incomes and prospects for the future are inevitably founded in the
expectation that their jobs will continue. For employees in many situations dismissal is a disaster.
For some employees it may mean breaking up a community and uprooting of homes and
families. Others, particularly older employees, may be faced with the greatest difficulty in
finding jobs (Report of the Donovan Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer
Associations, 1965-78:142).
Relatively few academic studies have been conducted in the area of unfair dismissals in the
United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand even though claims against unfair dismissals form a
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significant portion of employee grievance arbitration. There is a dearth of research in Australia
as well.
This study will contribute significantly to the body of knowledge of Australian industrial
relations specifically in the area of unfair dismissals under the current federal legislation (WR
Act). Until now very little is known about how well the relatively recent piece of legislation is
influencing arbitration outcomes in relation to unfair dismissals. There is some anecdotal
evidence that the present legislation is far less employee-friendly than its predecessor, the
Industrial Relations Reform Act, 1993 (Cth).
It would be useful to be able to determine what approach arbitrators will take when considering
the appropriate remedy for proven unfair dismissal. It is important to gain an understanding of
the circumstances that lead to the awarding of reinstatement as opposed to monetary
compensation. Where reinstatement is ordered, what length of suspension is compensated? This
is another key question. Length of suspension is the period between the date of dismissal and the
date of reinstatement. Whenever monetary compensation is awarded, what factors influence the
approach taken by the arbitrators? How is the quantum of monetary compensation reached?
This research will provide statistical evidence to provide a clearer picure in relation to this
matter.
LEGAL AVENUES FOR PURSUING UNFAIR DISMISSALS
In Australia, three legal avenues are available to employees against unfair dismissal (termination of
employment at the initiative of the employer). These avenues, the employees they cover and the
third party neutrals charged with deciding the outcome are as follows:
Legal Avenues Available to Employees
LEGAL AVENUES EMPLOYEES THIRD PARTY
COVERED NEUTRALS
The Common Law All Judges
Federal Law - The WR Generally all except those Commissioners of the
Act specifically excluded by Australian Industrial
the WRAct Relations Commission
(AIRC)
State Law Employees covered by Arbitrators of Employment
State law Tribunals provided by
State or Territory
Governments
The first legal avenue available to dismissed employees is common law (Macken, O'Grady and
Sappideen, 1997: 2-3). The courts are generally the avenue for senior managers whose termination
from employment is neither covered by a specific statute nor by a collective agreement (Grubb and
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Naughton, 1992:913). However, the pursuit of wrongful dismissal action through the courts can be
costly in terms of time and litigation fees and is only worthwhile for employees who can expect
enough damages to make the action worthwhile.
The second legal avenue governing dismissal is Federal law. The WR Act conferred unfair
dismissals jurisdiction on the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC). The numerous
decisions of the Commissioners of the AIRC acting as arbitrators forms the jurisprudence of this
regime (Lawrence, 1998:53).
The third legal avenue arises from the provisions of the WR Act which sends non-federal award
employees back to their state jurisdictions with the exception of Victoria which transferred most of
its industrial power to the Commonwealth (Wheelwright, 1999: 122, 177) in 1996.
The scope of the study is limited to the second legal avenue, that is unfair dismissals under the WR
Act. In each of the legal avenues governing unfair dismissal, judges and arbitrators have adopted a
theory or interpretation of what constitutes unfair dismissals based upon the actions of employer,
actions of employees, history of the employee's employment with an employer and other relevant
factors that may impact upon the employment relationship. In addition, certain remedies have been
awarded to unfairly dismissed employees.
RESEARCH APPROACH
Data for empirical analysis was collected from unfair dismissal case decisions rendered by the
AIRC. These cases on unfair dismissals were obtained from the on-line AustLII Databases. This site
on the Internet is provided by the Australian Legal Information Institute (AustLII) Federal
Government of Australia (URL:http://www.austlii.edu.au/databases.html) and provides a free
database of cases determined by the AIRC amongst others.
Decisions dealing solely with the preliminary objections regarding the AIRC's jurisdiction to hear
the case or extension of time applications was excluded from the study. Such jurisdictional issues
include disputes as to whether complainants met the eligibility requirements of the statutory
protection.
There were 684 cases of arbitration decisions ranging from 25 to 75 pages each in length
available as the total population for this study. Initially, the whole population of cases was
grouped into different industry type in accordance with the industry classification of the
Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC avilable at
http:www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@nst/Lookup/NTOOO 14E8A).
Rigorous and robust research requires a sizeable sample. It was determined that half of this
population (see below) of each industry or 342 cases would be sufficiently representative sample.
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Summary of Sample of Arbitration Decisions by Year






The next step involved ensuring that there was a level of randomness in selecting samples of the 17
industries. With this aim, every second case listed in each industry grouping was selected for
analysis. In other words, 50 per cent of all cases in each industry grouping was selected for analysis.
The advantage of this data set is that it yields a reasonable number of cases for analysis over a four-
year period and across all industries. The details of the selected sample are shown below:
Sample by Industry
Industry No. of Cases 0/0








Accommodation & 20 5.8
Restaurants
Transport & Storage 33 9.6
Communications 18 5.3
Finance & Insurance 5 1.5
Property & Business 45 13.2
Govt. & Defence 15 4.4
Education 12 3.5
Health 14 4.1
Culture & Recreation 17 5.0




The research objectives with respect to unfair dismissals and remedies require investigation covering
four dependent variables:
1. complaint of unjust dismissal denied (decision favoured the employer) or upheld
(decision favoured the employee);
2. the remedy awarded (in cases where the complainant is either reinstated or awarded
monetary compensation);
3. the amount of damages (salary in weeks) awarded to compensate for the length of
suspension (period between dates of dismissal and reinstatement) where reinstatement
is ordered; and
4. the amount of monetary compensation (salary in weeks) awarded where employee is
not reinstated.
These variables are illustrated below in the conceptual model for this research.
Figure 1 - Conceptual fv10delof the Research
Arbi trati on Outcomes:
Corrplains - 342 cases
/~
Denied 169 cases
Monetary Comp ensation 163 cases Reinstatement 37 cas es
IvIagnitude f compensation
(range: 1 - 38 weeks; mean: 13 weeks)
Damages for suspension
(range: 0-64 weeks; mean: 18 weeks)
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The Figure I shows the possible outcomes from the arbitration process. A complainant may be
reinstated without penalty (that is, no suspension), which would result in an award of full
backpay. Where a penalty such as suspension without pay is imposed, it may result in partial or
no backpay, depending on the length of suspension ordered. The length of suspension would
generally not extend beyond the date ofthe arbitrator's decision.
Monetary compensation, for complainants not reinstated, is usually awarded in lieu of number of
weeks of remuneration. Occasionally, a lump sum figure is awarded based on remuneration and
other relevant factors specific to each case. The dependent variables identified above will be
logically examined in this study.
Independent Variables
Under section 170CG(3) of the WR Act, for a dismissal to be fair there must be a valid reason.
The valid reason is similar to just cause principles under common law. Section 170 CG(3)
specific requirements are:
(a) whether there was a valid reason for the termination related to the capacity or conduct
of the employee or to the operational requirements to the employer's undertaking,
establishment or service;
(b) whether the employee was notified of that reason; and
(c) whether the employee was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to
the capacity or conduct of the employee; and
(d) if the termination related to unsatisfactory performance by the employee - whether
the employee had been warned about the unsatisfactory performance before the
termination; and
(e) any other matters that the Commission considers relevant.
Further under section 170 CH (2) the AIRC is required to have regard to all the circumstances of
the case in awarding an appropriate remedy including:
(a) the effect of the order on the viability of the employer's undertaking, establishment
or service;
(b) the length of the employee's service with the employer;
(c) the remuneration that the employee would have received, or would have been likely
to receive, if the employee's employment had not been terminated;
(d) the efforts of the employee (if any) to mitigate the loss suffered by the him/her as a
result of the termination; and
(e) any other matter that the AIRC considers relevant.
Independent variables were expected to be associated with the primary dependent variable
(complaint denied or upheld). Independent variables were also expected to influence the other
dependent variables. Most independent variables examined in respect to the primary dependent
variable are those considered to be the just cause principles (Davies and Freedland, 1984:428-32)
under common law..
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These variables are grouped into the following categories:
1. the type of offence;
2. characteristics of the complaint; and
3. characteristics of the employer.
Other independent variables included in the study were derived from common law's just cause
principles which related to the employer's actions and section 170 CH 92) above. These were
expected to be positively associated with complaints being upheld by arbitrators and include: failure
to administer warnings (Nicholson v. Heaven and Earth Galleries 1994 cited in Wheelwright,
1999: 134-5), to employees dismissed for non-disciplinary (e.g. redundancy), reasons (Windsor
Smith v. Liu & Ors, 1997), absence of a culminating incident, improper promulgation of work rules
(Atkins v. Telstra Corp. Ltd, 1998), unequal treatment, provocation, condonation (Eden, 1990), and
lack of procedural fairness (failure to conduct a reasonable investigation, failure to hold a fair
hearing and give employees an opportunity to explain their actions [Perrin v Des Taylor Pty Ltd,
1995]).
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Both logistic and ordinary regression models (using SPSS program) were applied for the
purposes of this study. It is worth noting that regression analyses reveal relationships among
variables but do not imply that the relationships are causal (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2001:115).
Demonstrating cause is a logical and experimental exercise rather than a statistical exercise
Strong relationships between variables could emanate from different sources, including the
influence of other variables that were not measured for inclusion in the regression analyses
(Morgan and Griego, 1998: 158).
Another issue that has more to do with theory rather than statistics is the question of which
variables to include in the analyses. For example, which dependent variable is to be used and
how it is to be measured? Also, which independent variables are to be used and how are they to
be measured? Further, if one already has some independent variables in an equation, which
independent variables should be added to the equation for the most improvement in the equation?
Tabachnik and Fidell (2001: 116) suggest that the answers to these questions can be provided by
theory, astute observation and good hunches. Their suggestions have been adopted in this study.
The literature review, previous research, the researchers knowledge of the cases (gained from
reading the cases) in the sample, their own previous research, and their significant professional
experience in this particular area of employment relations guide the selection of variables in this
study.
Complaints Upheld Or Denied
The analysis begins with the first dependent variable' AWARD', that is whether a complaint was
upheld or denied and the predictor variables associated with the decisions of arbitrators to uphold
or deny the employee complaints. Table 1 below starts with overall descriptive statistics.
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Table 1 - Complaints Upheld Overview
(n=342)
Year of award * complaint upheld Crosstabulation
complaint upheld
no yes Total
Year of 1997 Count 41 44 85
award % within Year of award 48.2% 51.8% 100.0%
% within complaint
24.3% 25.4% 24.9%upheld
1998 Count 58 60 118
% within Year of award 49.2% 50.8% 100.0%
% within complaint
34.3% 34.7% 34.5%upheld
1999 Count 52 51 103
% within Year of award 50.5% 49.5% 100.0%
% within complaint
30.8% 29.5% 30.1%upheld
2000 Count 18 18 36
% within Year of award 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
% within complaint
10.7% 10.4% 10.5%upheld
Total Count 169 173 342
% within Year of award 49.4% 50.6% 100.0%
% within complaint
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%upheld
Table 1 shows the frequency and percentage of complaints denied versus complaints upheld for
all the 342 cases for the 4-year period 1997 to 2000. Overall, 50.6% of the complaints were
upheld, that is the arbitrators ruled in favour of the employee. Conversely, 49.4% of the total
cases were denied, that is, the arbitrators' ruling favoured the employer. When each year is
examined individually, it appears that the same trend is true, that is there is an approximate 50:50
ratio between cases ruled in favour of the employee and those favouring the employer
It appears that overall both employers and employees had an equal chance of winning (or losing)
their cases in the 4 years covered by this study. The next stage involves examining variables that
possibly influenced arbitrators' decisions using descriptive statistics. Table 2 commences this
exercise.
For employees whose complaints were upheld, it is necessary to investigate the proportion who
were reinstated and those who were not reinstated but instead awarded compensation. A cross-
tabulation output in table 2 displays this statistics by displaying the breakdown of employees
reinstated and the number of employees who were not reinstated but received compensation
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only. Out of the total of 173 employees who were successful in having their complaints upheld,
37 were reinstated whilst 136 were awarded compensation only.
Table 2 - Complaint Upheld to Reinstatement Ratio
(n=173)




complaint upheld yes 136 37 173
Total 136 37 173
Next, table 3 displays the frequency of employee characteristics (offences, disciplinary record,
behavioural aspects, occupation classification and gender) as well as employer characteristics
(actions taken by employer and industry classification) for all the 342 cases.
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics for 342 Dismissal Cases, 1997-2000
VARIABLES FREQUENCY DID
Offences
Excessive absenteeism 9 2.6
Absent - no permission 45 13.2
Quit!resigned/redundancy/abandonment!ill/incapacity 127 37.1
Negligent 19 5.6
Employee excluded by WR Act 20 5.8
Insubordination 29 8.5
Dishonest 64 18.7
Unsatisfactory performance 107 31.3
Alcohol/drugs/gambling 17 5
Incompatibility with other employees/supervisor/customers 72 21.1
Violation of rules 152 44.4
Conflict of interest, threat!assault on management! fellow employee/
customers/public 17 5
Emnlovee's Record
I. Prior suspension without pay 0 0
2. Prior written warning 76 22.2
3. Prior oral warning 39 11.4
4. No reference to employee's record 1 0.3
5. Clean - no prior discipline 226 66.1
Number of years of service - mean = 4.98 years - -
12
Table 3 - continued
Emnlovee - Other Behavioural Asnects
Pattern of misconduct/incompetence 108 31.6
Premeditated misconduct 116 33.9
Remorse/apology 32 9.4
Compassionate/economic hardship circumstances 58 17
Rehabilitative potential present 95 27.8
Emolovee's Occuoation
I. Unskilled 40 11.7
2. Skilled ISO 43.9
3. Clerical 50 14.6
4. Sales 43 12.6
5. Professional/Technical 32 9.4





Failure to warn of unsatisfactory performance 48 14
Failure to apply progressive discipline 43 12.6
Lack of procedural fairness 115 33.6
Improper promulgation of rules 33 9.6
Unequal treatment of employee in administering discipline 7 2
Provocation by employer/other employees 13 3.8
Condonation of similar behaviour by other employees 6 1.8
Emnlover's Industrv
I. Agriculture, Fisheries & Farming 3 0.9
2. Mining 21 6.1
3. Manufacturing 66 19.3
4. Electricity, Gas & Water 4 1.2
5. Construction 18 5.3
6. Wholesale 9 2.6
7. Retail 35 10.2
8. Accommodation and Restaurants 20 5.8
9. Transportation and Storage 33 9.6
10. Communications 18 5.3
11 Finance and Insurance 5 1.5
12. Property and Business Services 45 13.2
13. Govt. and Defence 15 4.4
14. Education 12 3.5
15. Health 14 4.1
16. Culture and Recreation 17 5.0
17. Personal Services and Others 7 2.0
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In interpreting these statistics, it must be noted that each individual case may have one or more
of the employee characteristics (with the exception of gender and job classification). For
example, an employee may have been 'absent without permission' as well as 'dishonest'.
Under employee 'Offences' the highest frequency is in 'violation of rules' followed by
'quit/resigned/redundancy/abandonment/illness and incapacity', 'unsatisfactory performance',
and 'incompatibility with other employees or supervisor'. The other items worth noting may be
those with smaller double-digit percentages such as 'absent without permission' and
'dishonesty' .
Under 'Employee's Record', it is interesting to note that about two-thirds (66.1%) of the
employees had no previous record of being disciplined. Under 'Employee- Other Behavioural
Aspects', it is worth noting that employees displaying a pattern of misconduct/incompetence and
intentionally committing an act of misconduct ('premeditated misconduct') have high
frequencies (31.6% and 33.9% respectively). The next stage involved logistical regression
analysis.
To identify significant independent variables in relation to the first dependent variable -
'A WARD' (that is employee's complaint upheld or denied), the 'Enter' method was used. All
independent variables selected are added to a single regression model. This step produced the
outputs displayed in tables 4 and 5.
14
Table 4 - All Variables In Equation for Award
(n=342)
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sia. Exp(B)
s1ep ABSENT(1) -1.061 1.428 .551 1 .458 .346
1 ABSENTWP(1) .587 1.029 .326 1 .568 1.799
NEGLlGNT(1 ) .855 1.095 .611 1 .435 2.352
NODISMIS(1) .993 .857 1.342 1 .247 2.699
EXCBYACT(1) 1.972 1.158 2.899 1 .089 7.186
INSUBORD(1 ) -.632 .837 .571 1 .450 .531
DISHONST(1 ) 2.230 1.154 3.730 1 .053 9.296
PERFORM(1) .643 .718 .802 1 .370 1.902
ALCDRUGS(1) -.555 1.125 .243 1 .622 .574
ATTITUDE(1) .372 .775 .231 1 .631 1.451
RULES(1) .003 .733 .000 1 .996 1.003
OTHER(1) 16.552 2574.591 .000 1 .995 15438840
RECORD .206 .302 .464 1 .496 1.228
SERVYR .065 .029 4.915 1 .027 1.067
GENDER(1) .344 .467 .543 1 .461 1.411
PATTERN(1) 1.465 .944 2.407 1 .121 4.326
PREMEDIT(1) 1.129 .803 1.980 1 .159 3.094
YSREMORS(1) 1.239 1.223 1.026 1 .311 3.451
FAILDISP(1 ) -4.221 1.482 8.109 1 .004 .015
FAILWARN(1) -3.526 1.156 9.308 1 .002 .029
PROC_ERR(1) -35.039 3637.482 .000 1 .992 .000
WORKRULE(1) -3.628 1.449 6.271 1 .012 .027
UNEQTRMT(1) -21.360 11333.099 .000 1 .998 .000
PROVOKE(1) -21.337 8197.565 .000 1 .998 .000
CONDONE(1) -14.116 12407.413 .000 1 .999 .000
Constant 76.080 18872.882 .000 1 .997 1.10E+33
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: ABSENT, ABSENTWP, NEGLIGNT, NODISMIS, EXCBYACT,
INSUBORD, DISHONST, PERFORM, ALCDRUGS, ATTITUDE, RULES, OTHER, RECORD,
SERVYR, GENDER, PATTERN, PREMEDIT, YSREMORS, FAILDISP, FAILWARN, PROC_ERR,
WORKRULE, UNEQTRMT, PROVOKE, CONDONE.
Table 4 confirms that there are only 5 significant predictors (from which the prediction of 89.8
per cent was made in table 4), that is, those with p values of .05 or less. These predictors are
DISHONEST (.053) SERVYR (.027), FAILDISP (.004), FAILWARN (.002), and WORKRULE
(.012). The next logical step would be to construct a reduced model with only these 5 significant
predictors in order to determine whether these predictors remain significant. Tabachnik and
Fidell (2001: 116) state that the general goal of regression is to identify the fewest independent
variables necessary to predict a dependent variable (where each independent variable predicts a
substantial and independent segment of the variability in the dependent variable). Therefore,
using the 'Enter' method a new logistic regression equation was constructed with the 5
predictors. Table 5 below is an output from this stage of the analysis.
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Table 5- Significant Variables for Award
(n=342)
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df SiQ. Exp(B)
S!ep DISHONST(1 ) 1.835 .465 15.603 1 .000 6.268
1 SERVYR .026 .021 1.490 1 .222 1.026
FAILDISP(1) -4.295 1.064 16.285 1 .000 .014
FAILWARN(1) -3.552 .765 21.536 1 .000 029
WORKRULE(1) -3.212 .824 15.209 1 .000 .040
Constant 8.625 1.518 32.295 1 .000 5570.735
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: DISHONST, SERVYR, FAILDISP, FAILWARN, WORKRULE.
Table 5 shows that when a logistic regression is run for the 5 predictors only, 'SERVYR' is
showing up as insignificant (.222) while all the other 4 predictors remain significant. As this
model included an insignificant predictor, another regression analysis is necessary with the
exclusion of 'SERVYR'.
Table 6 shows the outputs for the remaining 4 significant predictors:
Table 6 - Variables in Equation Using Reduced Model for Award
(n=342)
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
S~ep DISHONST(1) 1.827 .462 15.638 1 .000 6.215
1 FAILDISP(1 ) -4.344 1.071 16.462 1 .000 .013
FAILWARN(1) -3.526 .767 21.138 1 .000 .029
WORKRULE(1) -3.215 .820 15.372 1 .000 .040
Constant 8.792 1.516 33.614 1 .000 6579.010
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: DISHONST, FAILDISP, FAILWARN, WORKRULE.
In table 6, the value of Exp(B) gives the "odds ratio", which is the increase (or decrease if the
ratio is less than one) in odds of being in one outcome category when the value of the predictor
increases by one unit (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001 :548). Odds ratios of greater than 1 show the
increase in odds of an outcome of 1 (the 'response' category) with a one-unit change in the
predictor. In this model for the dependent variable 'AWARD' the following interpretations
apply:
• for the predictor 'DISHONEST'(Exp(B) of6.215), which means that where an employee
was found to be dishonest, the odds of the complaint being declined rather than upheld
are over 6 times as much as where an employee was not dishonest;
• FAILDISP - where the employer fails to carry out progressive discipline, the odds of the
employee's complaint being upheld increases by 98.7% (1-.013);
• FAIL WARN - where an employer fails to warn an employee of unsatisfactory
performance, the odds of the employee's complaint being upheld increases by 97.1% (1-
16
·029); and
• WORKRULE - where there is improper promulgation of workrules by the employer, the
odds of the employee's complaint being upheld increases by 96% (1-.040).
These are interesting statistics as they give an indication of the predictors that are highly likely to
affect the decision-making of an arbitrator in relation to upholding or denying an employee's
complaint. Dishonesty by an employee is almost certain to swing a decision in favour of the
employer whereas failing to apply progressive discipline, failing to warn of unsatisfactory
performance, and improper promulgation of work rules on the part of the employer are
shortcomings that are likely to swing the decision in favour of the employee.
Remedy: Reinstatement
The second dependent variable is damages (measured in weeks of remuneration) awarded to
those employees who were reinstated, that is, employees who were returned to employment with
their employers after arbitrators upheld their complaints. In total 37 employees out of the 173
employees (refer to table 2 above) who were successful in having their complaints upheld were
reinstated. Cross-tabulation in Table 7 illustrates the number of weeks of suspension ("SUSPSN'
- number of weeks between dismissal and reinstatement) in the first left column in relation to
damages (weeks of remuneration awarded) that the 37 reinstated employees received in other
columns.
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Table 7 - Number of Weeks of Damages
(n=37)
time-dismissal to reinstatement-weeks * no of weeks Crosstabulation
Count
no of weeks Tot
0 2 4 6 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 21 22 24 26 35 37 48 62 64 al
time 4 3 3
from 9 1 1
dismiss 11 1 1
al to 13
1 1reinstate
ment in 14 1 1
weeks 16 2 2
17 1 1
18 1 1
24 1 1 2
25 1 1
26 1 2 1 3 7





39 1 1 2
43 1 1 2
52 1 1





7 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 6 1 1 1 1 1 37
It is apparent that most reinstated employees were compensated for a good part of their time of
suspension. For example line item number 6 (row 6) shows that 2 employees suspended for 16
weeks were awarded 16 weeks of damages. In these cases the employee suffered no financial
loss for the period between dismissal and the reinstatement. For a small number of cases, this
was not the case. For example, the last line item shows an employee who was suspended for 100
weeks and yet was only awarded damages worth 48 weeks. These can be explained by extracting
the reason stated by the arbitrator in their decisions. The two main reasons cited by the
arbitrators for the reduction of damages were:
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• to account for compensation already paid to the employee prior to termination, for
example, sums in-lieu of notice or redundancy payments (where the termination was
disguised as a redundancy); and
• the employee was culpable to a certain extent and therefore warranting a punitive
reduction to reflect this culpability.
The above explanation also holds true for all the 7 cases with no compensation being awarded
for the period of suspension.
Table 8 below shows summary statistics. The minimum number of weeks of damages awarded
was 0 weeks while the maximum awarded was 64 weeks with a mean of 17.57 weeks. The
minimum suspension was 4 weeks while the maximum was 100 weeks with a mean of 30.7
weeks. The standard deviation denotes the spread of the data.
Table 8 - Descriptive Statistics of Number of Weeks of Damages
(n= 37)
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
time-dismissal to
37 100 30.70reinstatement-weeks 4
19.473
no of weeks 37 0 64 17.57 16.290
Valid N (listwise) 37
• The next stage is to carry out a regression analysis for the second dependent variable, that
is 'DAMAGES' awarded to 37 employees who were reinstated. This involved using the
'Enter' method to determine the variables that were significant. An ordinary regression
analysis is appropriate here because the dependent variable 'DAMAGES' is numerical
rather than binary. The output from this analysis is discussed below.
The output produced is shown as Table 9 below. It shows that only one significant predictor has
a p value of less than .05, that is, SUSPENSN (time interval between dismissal and reinstatement
in weeks).
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Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 3.860 19.812 .195 .847
SERVYR -.418 .384 -.223 -1.091 .288
YSREINST -10.200 18.081 -.173 -.564 .579
GENDER 13.043 10.533 .252 1.238 .229
JOBCLASS 1.005 2.486 .076 .404 .690
YSCOMPSN 3.957 5.033 .123 .786 .441
YSREMORS -14.666 7.360 -.312 -1.993 .059
CONFLICT 1.933 7.449 .044 .260 .798
JOBGONE -16.560 15.223 -.233 -1.088 .289
NOFNDJOB -4.435 11.095 -.086 -.400 .693
BROKDOWN -5.307 15.994 -.103 -.332 .743
LABMKT 21.859 17.119 .221 1.277 .216
SUSPENSN .641 .155 .766 4.146 .000
YSMITIGT 5.676 8.158 .171 .696 .494
YSFAULT 8.081 6.449 .240 1.253 .224
NEWJOB -15.385 9.235 -.394 -1.666 .111
a. Dependent Variable: no of weeks
Again, similar to AWARD, this significant predictor is analysed in a new regression model
leaving out all the other insignificant predictors. The outputs from this analysis in the form of
tables 10 and 11 are discussed below.





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 2.519 4.150 .607 .548
SUSPNSN .490 .115 .586 4.278 .000
a. Dependent Variable: no of weeks
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Table 10 shows the regression equation output with the significant predictor SUSPNSN only and
it confirms that it is a very significant predictor of damages paid to reinstated employees. The
unstandardized coefficients are the coefficients of the estimated regression model. In the present
model, the estimated 'DAMAGES' = 2.519 + 0.49SUSPNSN. It states that the expected
damages ('DAMAGES') is equal to 2.519 + 0.49 x SUSPNSN. Say for example an employee's
time of suspension ('SUSPNSN') is 20 weeks, the predicted damages ('DAMAGES') would be
2.519 + 20 x 0.49 = 12.319 or about 12 weeks. Table 13 below explains further the influence of
this predictor.
Table 11 - Model Summary for Damages
(n= 37)
Model Summary
Adjusted Std. Error of
Model R R Square R Square the Estimate
1 .586a .343 .325 13.388
a. Predictors: (Constant), SUSPENSN (time-dismissal to
reinstatement-weeks)
Table 11 reports the strength of the relationship between the model and the dependent variable.
R, the multiple correlation coefficient, is the linear correlation between the observed and model-
predicted values of the dependent variable. Its fairly large value indicates a strong relationship. R
Square, the coefficient of determination, is the squared value of the multiple correlation
coefficient. R square (.325) indicates the proportion of the variability in the dependent variable
(DAMAGES) which is accounted for by the multiple regression equation. In other words, 32%
of the variability in the dependent variable 'DAMAGES' results from the predictor variable
'SUSPENSN' .
Remedy: Compensation
The third and final dependent variable is 'COMPENSA TION' (measured in weeks of
remuneration awarded) awarded to those employees whose complaints were upheld but were not
reinstated. In total 136 employees out of the 173 employees (refer to table 2 above) who were
successful in having their complaints upheld were awarded compensation only. In other words,
the 136 employees were not reinstated. Cross tabulation in Table 12 shows the number of weeks
('TIME' - time interval between dismissal and decision in weeks) the employee had to wait
between dismissal and the date of award of compensation as indicated in the first left column in
relation to the number of weeks of compensation (number of weeks of remuneration) awarded to
the employee (shown in the other columns).
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Table 12 - Number of Weeks of Compensation
(n= 136)
Time lapse between termination & decision-weeks * no of weeks Crosstabulation
Count
no of weeks of damaaes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 16 18 19 20 22 23 24 26 31 34 38 Total
Time 13 1 1 1 1 4
lapse 17 1 1 1 1 4 3 1 1 13
between 22 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 11
term
-ination 26 1 1 3 1 2 4 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 23
& 30 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 5 1 20
decision 35 2 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 12
in 39 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 4 14
weeks 43 1 1 2 1 5
48 2 1 2 1 1 2 9
52 1 1 1 1 2 3 9
56 1 1 1 2 5
61 1 1 3 1 6





3 5 5 11 9 6 2 13 2 4 2 10 13 4 8 1 2 4 4 1 1 23 1 1 1 136
It is clear here that there is scant evidence of correlation between compensation awarded and
'TIME'.
It is also clear that in most cases, the arbitrators stuck to compensating the employee with the
maximum of 26 weeks allowed by legislation. However, there are 3 cases where this has been
exceeded and this can be explained by reading the cases to examine the reasons cited by the
arbitrators. These 3 cases relate to redundancies where the arbitrator awarded further
compensation over and above redundancy payments already made by the employer. The
compensation figures in these 3 cases therefore include redundancy compensation already paid to
the employee. This may be seen as punitive by the employers but from the arbitrator's viewpoint
it may be seen as further industrial justice for employees who for some reason or other cannot be
reinstated. The fact that the employee could not be reinstated for a variety of reasons influenced
the arbitrator to award the maximum possible compensation to the vindicated employee.
There are number of cases where employees were not awarded the full compensation for the time
that they had to wait between dismissal and the decision of the arbitrator. From reading the cases,
it is not clear as to why the arbitrator chose not to award the full compensation in some cases
whereas in others, the formula prescribed in section 170 CH(2) has been applied.
Table 13 below shows that the minimum number of weeks of compensation awarded was 1 week
while the maximum awarded was 38 weeks with a mean of 13.21 weeks. The minimum 'waiting
period' ('TIME') between termination and decision of the arbitrator was 13 weeks while the
maximum was 186 weeks with a mean of 36.45 weeks. The standard deviation denotes the
spread of the data.
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Table 13 - Descriptive Statistics for Compensation
(n= 136)
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
no of weeks 136 1 38 13.21 8.592
Time lapse between
termination & 136 13 186 36.45 20.100
decision-weeks
Valid N (Iistwise) 136
The next stage involves regression analysis for 'COMPENSA nON' (measured in weeks of
remuneration awarded) and its predictors. Again as in the case of 'DAMAGES' for
reinstatement, 'COMPENSA nON' is a quantitative rather than a binary variable and therefore a
linear regression model is appropriate.





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 12.469 2.268 5.499 .000
SERVYR .367 .129 .234 2.843 .005
GENDER -.265 1.427 -.015 -.186 .853
JOBCLASS -.082 .442 -.015 -.185 .853
NEWJOB -.917 1.970 -.048 -.465 .642
NOFNDJOB .816 2.172 .033 .376 .708
TIME .134 .152 .073 .881 .380
LABMKT 7.261 3.835 .160 1.893 .061
YSMITIGT 2.146 1.817 .125 1.181 .240
YSFAULT -6.630 1.407 -.385 -4.711 .000
a. Dependent Variable: COMPENSATION - no of weeks
Table 14 shows the output for the regression analysis with all predictors for the dependent
variable 'COMPENSA nON'. Only 2 predictors are significant, that is 'SERVYR' and
'YSFAULT". Again as before with 'DAMAGES', it is necessary to run a regression model with
only these 2 significant predictors. The outputs for this model are shown in tables 15 and 16
below.
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Model B Std. Error Beta t Siq.
1 (Constant) 14.488 1.061 13.661 .000
SERVYR .331 .124 .210 2.673 .008
YSFAULT -6.280 1.356 -.364 -4.633 .000
a. Dependent Variable: COMPENSATION- no of weeks
Table 15 shows the regression output with the significant predictors YSF AUL T and SERVYR
only and it confirms that the two predictors are very significant predictors in relation to
compensation paid to employees (whose complaints were upheld but were not reinstated to jobs
with their previous employers).
In the present model, the estimated 'COMPENSA nON' = 14.488 + 0.331SERVYR -
6.280YSFAULT. It states that the expected compensation is equal to 14.488 + 0.331 x SERVYR
- 6.280 x YSFAULT. Say for example an employee's years of service were 5 years ('SERVYR')
and the employee was to a certain extent culpable (YSF AULT), the predicted compensation
would be 14.488 + 0.331 x 5 - 6.280 = 9.863 or about 10 weeks. The ideal situation from the
employees viewpoint would then be where the employee is completely vindicated, that is
YSF AUL T = 0 and therefore there is no erosion of compensation as a result. It is also clear, that
every year of service adds a factor of 0.331 weeks of compensation for the employee whose
complaint was upheld but who was not reinstated. Table 16 below explains further the impact of
these predictors.
Table 16 - Model Summary for Compensation
(n=136)
Model Summary
Adjusted Std. Error of
Model R R Square R Square the Estimate
1 .422a .178 .165 7.849
a. Predictors: (Constant), YSFAUL T, SERVYR
Table 16 reports the strength of the relationship between the model and the dependent variable.
R, the multiple correlation coefficient. is the linear correlation between the observed and model-
predicted values of the dependent variable. Its reasonably high value indicates a good
relationship. R Square, the coefficient of determination, is the squared value of the multiple
correlation coefficient. R square (.178) indicates the proportion of the variability in the
dependent variable (COMPENSA nON) which is accounted for by the two predictors
('YSFAUL T' and 'SERVYR') in the multiple regression equation. In other words, 18% of the




This research presents empirical evidence with regard to the 3 central dependent variables
(complaint upheld or denied, reinstatement or monetary compensation, and magnitude of
damages awarded to those reinstated) in relation to arbitrator's decision to uphold or deny a
claim of unfair dismissal . Both descriptive descriptive and regression analysis has been
presented in this regard and therefore this study is statistically rigorous.
In summary, for the first dependent variable 'AWARD' (employee's complaint upheld or denied
by arbitrator) the following are worth noting:
• 51% were upheld;
• 21% of those upheld were reinstated while the remaining 79% were awarded
compensation only;
• the significant predictors were employee dishonesty, failure by employer to warn
employees of performance shortcomings, failure of employer to apply progressive
discipline, and improper promulgation of work rules by the employer.
With the second dependent variable, that is damages awarded to reinstated employees, the one
and only significant predictor was the period of suspension for the employee.
For the final dependent variable which is compensation awarded to employees not reinstated
although their complaints were upheld), the significant predictors were the employee being at
fault and the employee's duration of service.
Implications of the legislation for employers depend on the interpretation of the results of this
study. Given that overall 51% of the unfair dismissal complaints by employees were upheld by
arbitrators, it could be said that from the employers' perspective unnecessary expenditure may
have been incurred from the date of termination to the date of the decision of the arbitrator. The
expenditure may come in the form of legal advice and representation, time of staff involved etc.
Additionally, the pending action may cause adversity towards the employer by existing staff and
unions. The cost of this adversity is not really quantifiable in dollar terms but needless to say it
will impact on productivity somewhere along the way in the continuum of industrial relations.
No doubt, factors other than merit may influence the parties to proceed to arbitration. However,
it is reasonable to assume that the probable outcome is an important consideration in making that
decision. Accordingly it could be argued that in light of the fact that 51% of complaints were
upheld, a change in employer industrial relations practices is necessary, especially if employers
desire a majority of decisions to favour them.
Given that the research shows some measure of predictability in terms of the factors considered
by arbitrators in making their decisions, there may be strategic implications for the way
employers respond to employee misconduct in the workplace. To some extent, arbitrator
decisions may force employers into reshaping processes that relate to performance management,
discipline and termination.
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Specifically, employer response to an employee's wrongdoing should include consideration of
the nature of the offence, the employee's record and the length of service prior to resorting to
dismissal. The employer must observe the statutory requirements of section 170 CG(3) and this
is best met by administering a fair and robust system of progressive discipline. One area
requiring improvement is the necessity to sufficiently document warnings and counselling as
well as provide necessary training for employees so that they can attain the standards expected
by the employer. Employers must make the necessary policy changes to ensure that
supervisors/managers are trained in the administration of progressive discipline. Compliance
with policy needs to be constantly monitored by employers as well.
An important point to recall is that the number of dismissed employees who actually pursued
unjust dismissal complaints under this legislation is unknown. If it is a small proportion,
employers may well weigh the risk of arbitration against any major change in practices.
Another factor to be considered in weighing the risk of arbitral intervention in the decision to
dismiss is the number of cases that are settled prior to arbitration. As this information is
unavailable, it is difficult to advise employers on the overall picture of unfair dismissals with this
part of the puzzle missing. It is suggested that employers seek alternative mechanisms to
arbitration to alleviate the considerable time delays in arbitration decisions. Such alternative
mechanisms could be to establish an internal employee-employer committee consisting of
persons with more in-depth knowledge of the workplace than third party arbitrators who have
little knowledge of the dynamics of a particular workplace.
Statutory protection under the WR Act also has important implications for employees covered
under this legislation. For employees, offences such as dishonesty reflect badly in the eyes of the
arbitrators. Long serving employees can expect their length of service to be taken into
consideration in the calculation of compensation. Where employers fail to apply progressive
discipline or where there is improper promulgation of work rules by the employers, employees
can expect a swing in their favour in the decision of arbitrators. The study clearly shows that the
WR Act, unlike its predecessor (IRR Act 1993), has lead arbitrators to treat procedural fairness
as a technical irregularity and thereby has provided reduced protection to employees. The
empirical analysis shows that lack of procedural fairness is clearly not a significant factor in
influencing the decision of the arbitrator. This confirms earlier suspicions by legal experts such
as Chief Justice Murray Wilcox (Wilcox, 1997: 84) that the new legislation will denigrate the
traditional importance of procedural fairness in the process of fair dismissal of employees.
Employees cannot rely on lack of procedural fairness by employers to be a factor that would
swing arbitrators' decisions in their favour. Employees may wish to lobby their politicians and
unions to restore the importance of procedural fairness in future legislation or even incorporate it
into employment contracts such as enterprise agreements and AWAs (Australian Workplace
Agreements).
Employees can take heart from the fact that 51% of the decisions of arbitrators went against the
employers. However, there is a downside to this fact in that only a small proportion (21%) of the
successful employees were reinstated. Although, the WR Act like its predecessor (IRR Act,
1993) retains reinstatement as the primary remedy, the results show that compensation is highly
likely to be granted over reinstatement by arbitrators. The fact that 79% of successful employees
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were only granted compensation seems to indicate that compensation rather than reinstatement is
the primary remedy.
Finally, the tendency to award monetary compensation far more frequently than reinstatement
could be viewed as a deficiency in the arbitral regime from the employee's perspective. The
unavailability of reinstatement as a remedy is seen as a major deficiency of the common law
regime. Statutory protection was intended to bridge this gap by providing reinstatement as a
primary remedy.
However, if arbitrators overwhelmingly rule against reinstatement then it begs the question of
whether the law in letter form differs from the law that is dispensed. No doubt, this research will
be useful information for employers, HR/IR managers,employees and employee advocates,
unions, employer associations, arbitrators, politicians and academics.
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